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Non-technical Summary
The IAB employment subsample (IABS) has become an important data
source for empirical research on the German labor market. It consists of
employment spells subject to social insurance and unemployment spells that
comprise information about the beginning and the end of an (un-)employment
period, daily wage, type of transfer payments, as well as several socio–demo-
graphic variables like, for instance, sex, year of birth, occupation, employ-
ment status, and education.
The reporting of the educational degree of an employee to the social insur-
ance agencies by the employer is part of the compulsory notification system.
However, the educational degree has no consequences concerning obligations
or claims out of the social security neither for the employer nor for the em-
ployee. Therefore, this variable can be regarded as less reliable than other
variables like wages. However, previous research on this issue has been scarce
although the problem of missing and inconsistent education information is
immediately apparent in the data set.
To deal with the problem of missing values and/or inconsistent sequences
of educational reports, we use deductive imputation methods that make use
of the panel structure of the data set. In addition, information contained
in the variables employment status and age is considered when constructing
the corrected education variables.
We develop three different imputation methods based on different assump-
tions on nature of the reporting process. Imputation procedure 1 assumes
that underreports are the only possible source of inconsistencies as some
employers – for reasons that are not observable to the researcher – do not
report the actual educational degree of the employee but the degree required
for the position. Under this scenario every higher degree is extrapolated to
subsequent spells with lower or missing education information. However, as
long as one cannot completely rule out the possibility of overreports this
procedure is likely to induce a considerable upward bias in the corrected ed-
ucation variable. Therefore, we develop two further imputation procedures
that distinguish between reliable reports that are used for extrapolation and
unreliable reports that have to be discarded. Imputation procedure 2 as-
sumes that the observed frequency of a reported degree can be interpreted
as a sign of its reliability. Imputation procedure 3, on the contrary, is based
on the assumption that reporting errors are serially correlated. In this case,
a change of the reported educational degree may reveal some information
on the reliability of the employer issuing the reports. Imputation procedure
1 possibly overstates education through a ratched effect when overreporting
occurs. The imputation procedures 2 and 3 allow for the possibility of over-
reporting. They use heuristic rules to identify valid education information in
a conservative way.
We argue that, if all three corrected education variables yield similar results
in different applications, we are likely to have found a good approximation
to true education using any of the corrected education variables.
Therefore, we compare in three typical labor economic applications the data
resulting from the three imputation procedures to the original data. We find
that the educational attainment of the labor force is higher than measured
with the original data. Moreover, we find that some measures of between
and within education group inequality, especially in the lower part of the
wage distribution, are sensitive to the education variable used, whereas the
estimated return to education does not vary much with the education variable
used. Overall, our results indicate that there is some evidence in favor of
the hypothesis that underreporting of educational degrees is a more severe
problem than overreporting. The evidence suggests that, in fact, employers
tend to report the degree required for the position rather than the highest
qualification attained by the employee.
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Abstract
The education variable in the IAB employment subsample has two
shortcomings: missing values and inconsistencies with the reporting
rule. We propose several deductive imputation procedures to improve
the variable. They mainly use the multiple education information
available in the data because the employees’ education is reported at
least once a year. We compare the improved data from the differ-
ent procedures and the original data in typical applications in labor
economics: educational composition of employment, wage inequality,
and wage regression. We find, that correcting the education variable:
(i) shows the educational attainment of the male labor force to be
higher than measured with the original data, (ii) gives different values
for some measures of wage inequality, and (iii) does not change the
estimates in wage regressions much.
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1 Introduction
The IAB employment subsample (IABS) has become an important data
source for empirical research on the German labor market, see Bender et
al. (2000) for a recent description of the data set. The IABS is a panel
data set comprising administrative records for employment spells and for
spells with transfer payments during periods of unemployment. Compared
to popular survey data sets like the German Socioeconomic Panel, the main
advantages of the IABS are its large size, the long time period it covers, the
almost complete absence of panel mortality, and the reliability of the core
variables like date and length of spells, earnings, or type of transfer pay-
ments. However, it is well known among users of the IABS that a number
of variables are less reliable since they are not related to the purpose of the
administrative reporting process producing the data. Nevertheless, research
on the reliability of the IABS has been very scarce (see Fitzenberger, 1999,
Steiner and Wagner, 1998, for rare exceptions).1
The returns to education and the skill bias in labor demand are two very
important issues studied in labor economics (see e.g. Card, 1999, Katz and
Autor, 1999, Fitzenberger, 1999) which require a reliable measure of formal
education. The IABS contains the variable BILD comprising information
on secondary and tertiary schooling degrees as well as on completion of a
vocational training degree (apprenticeship). This variable is based on the re-
ports by employers and the information is extrapolated to subsequent trans-
fer spells. This education variable exhibits a number of apparent problems.
First, there is missing information for 9.52% of the spells in the data set.
Second, the education variable suffers from a large number of inconsisten-
cies for a person over time. According to the reporting rule, employers are
supposed to report the highest degree attained by the employee and not the
degree required for the job. Hence, if once in the data a person is recorded to
have a certain educational degree and later is reported to have only a lower
degree, we know that at least one of these reports must be wrong. If the
incidence of these problems is not random, using the uncorrected data may
result in misleading conclusions about the distribution of education or the
relationship with other variables of interest.
1Earlier work (see e. g. Cramer, 1985, or Schma¨hl and Fachinger, 1994) pointed to some
problems in the administrative data on employment subject to social security taxation.
1
This paper develops some imputation procedures to improve the information
in the IABS education variable. The main idea of our imputation approach
is as follows: The panel nature of the data does not only allow us to identify
inconsistencies but, under reasonable assumptions, it also allows us to deduce
the likely education level of a person whose education information is missing
or is inconsistent for a small number of spells. If the education information
is missing for a small number of spells, we impute the likely education from
past or future information. If a reported degree differs for a small number
of spells from the likely education, we conclude that the currently reported
education is incorrect and we impute the likely education instead.
Imputation has been used before to improve the education variable in the
IABS. This paper extends upon the earlier work of Fitzenberger (1999, ap-
pendix) and Bender et al. (2005, chapter 3.4). We develop a number of
further refinements of the basic imputation procedures therein and we inves-
tigate the effects on three typical applications in labor economics.
Without knowing the unobserved true education, we cannot evaluate the
validity of our imputation procedures. Hence, evaluation criteria for impu-
tation which require the true values to be known, like those in Chambers
(2001), are not applicable here. This paper proposes three imputation pro-
cedures. Based on plausible assumptions about the reporting behavior of the
employers, one imputation procedure is more likely to overstate the true level
of education and two are more likely to understate it. We argue that, if the
resulting data from the different procedures are quite similar, our approach
is likely to be close to the truth. In order to evaluate the differences across
imputation procedures, we investigate three typical applications in labor eco-
nomics. In our first application we analyze the education mix in employment.
The second one examines changes in wage differentials across and within ed-
ucation groups over time. And the third one involves estimating Mincer-type
earnings equations.
An advantage of imputation methods is that the resulting data can be treated
as being measurement error free provided one is thinking that the imputation
method applied is valid. There exist alternative approaches in the literature
which use the misclassified data directly and take misclassification into ac-
count. These methods are application specific, as the following references
show. Molinari (2004), in a direct misclassification approach, makes ex-
ogenous assumptions about the misclassification probabilities and estimates
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identification regions for the true distribution based on the observed distri-
bution of the misclassified data. Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999) estimate
the returns to education when education is misclassified. They rely on two
measures of education which can both be mismeasured. These measures have
to be (mean) independent of each other and of the wage conditional on the
true education. The latter assumption is not likely to hold in our context.
For instance, as will be discussed in detail below, if the inconsistencies in the
education variable are mainly due to underreporting the level of education
for people who are overqualified with respect to their position, underreport-
ing is associated with a low wage given true education. Lewbel (2003) gives
necessary assumptions to estimate average treatment effects when treatment
is misclassified. Again, these conditions are unlikely to hold in our context.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
IABS data and provides details on the problems concerning the education
variable. Section 3 develops the different imputation procedures to improve
the education variable. Section 4 examines three typical applications to com-
pare the outcomes of the imputation procedures. Section 5 concludes. The
appendix includes detailed results.
2 The IAB Employment Subsample (IABS)
This section first describes the IABS and the education variable BILD. Then,
we discuss the shortcomings of BILD, namely, missing values and inconsis-
tencies over time.
2.1 Basic Description of IABS and BILD
We use the version of the IABS (IAB-Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe) for the time
period 1975-1997 distributed with detailed regional information (Regional-
file). A basic description of the data set can be found in Bender et al.
(2000). Our imputation procedures are relevant for all versions of the IABS.
The data used here contain daily register data of 589,825 individuals in Ger-
many on their employment spells and the spells during which they receive
transfer payments from the Federal Labor Office (formerly Bundesanstalt fu¨r
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Arbeit). It is a representative 1% sample of employment subject to social se-
curity taxation and, therefore, it is not representative with respect to periods
of nonemployment. After the end of the year and when a job ends, employ-
ers have to report earnings and other socio-demographic information about
their employees like their educational degree to the social insurance agencies.
The earnings information and the length of the employment spells are used
to calculate contributions to and benefits from the social insurance system
and, hence, are very reliable. Periods of self-employment and employment as
life-time civil servants (Beamte) that are not subject to (mandatory) social
insurance are not included in the data.
The education variable BILD in the IABS is a byproduct of a reported em-
ployment spell and bears no relevance for the social security system. To
our knowledge, reporting the employee’s education incorrectly has no conse-
quences. This can explain why BILD is less reliable compared to information
on earnings or the beginning and ending of spells. Spells on transfer pay-
ments and technical spells documenting gaps in the employment history, for
instance due to military service or maternity leave, do not provide new infor-
mation on the educational level. Instead BILD is extrapolated during such
spells based on the information in the most recent employment spell. Thus,
we base our imputation procedures only on the information given in employ-
ment spells. On average, the data contain 14.6 spells per person of which
12.3 are employment spells.
Since the variable BILD is based on employer reports to the social secu-
rity system, it is an important question how the reporting system changed
between 1975 and 1997, possibly affecting the reported education. As men-
tioned before, the basis of the IAB employment subsample is the integrated
reporting system for the social insurance, i. e. the statutory health, pension
and long-term care insurance. The notification procedure was introduced in
the former Federal Republic of Germany on 1 January 1973 and on 1 January
1991 – after the German reunification – in the new La¨nder and Berlin-East,
too. Since 1973 there have been several revisions of the legislation govern-
ing the formal way of how the notifications have to be submitted by the
employers.2 However, these changes did not concern the content – for in-
2A first major revision of the notification system took place in 1981 when the “Zweite
Datenerfassungsverordnung” and the “Zweite Datenu¨bermittlungsverordnung” came into
effect. The main goal of this new formulation has been to improve the completeness of the
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stance the precision – of the demographic variables contained in the so called
“Ta¨tigkeitsschlu¨ssel”.3 Thus, we conclude that inconsistencies in the edu-
cation variable over time are in fact attributable to employers’ unreliability
and not to institutional changes.
The education information in the IABS distinguishes four different educa-
tional degrees (≡ successful completion): high school (Abitur), vocational
training, technical college (Fachhochschule), and university. University is
considered the highest degree, a technical college the second highest. Since
there is no clear ranking between high school and vocational training, em-
ployers have to choose among all four combinations between the two. Thus,
BILD can take six possible meaningful values:
1. no degree at all (henceforth: ND),
2. vocational training degree (VT),
3. high school degree (HS),
4. high school degree and vocational training degree (HSVT),4
5. technical college degree (TC), and
6. university degree (UD).
We argue that these six educational outcomes can be ranked in increasing
order except for the fact that no ranking exists between the second degree
VT and the third degree HS. We consider the comprehensive degree HSVT to
overall amount of notifications in order to provide correct aggregate employment statistics
(cf. Wermter and Cramer, 1988). Second, there has been a change in the definition of the
gross salary subject to social security contributions in 1984 (“A¨nderungsverordnung zur
2. DEVO”; cf. Bender et al., 1996, and Fitzenberger, 1999, appendix). A third major
revision of the notification procedure came into effect in 1999 (“Datenerfassungs- und
u¨bermittlungsverordnung”). Henceforth, it has been required for all employers to submit
for all their employees subject to social insurance contributions uniform information, which
is suited for automated processing.
3The “Ta¨tigkeitsschlu¨ssel” comprises variables that describe the job content and the
qualification of the employee (cf.http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/
content/de DE/hauptstelle/a-07/importierter inhalt/pdf/schluessel.pdf).
The new “Datenerfassungs- und u¨bermittlungsverordnung” actually intended to introduce
a new “Ta¨tigkeitsschlu¨ssel” which though has not been implemented so far.
4In the following, we will refer to HSVT as if it is a separate degree even though it is
in fact a combination of two degrees.
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be higher than both HS and VT. Furthermore, if the employee’s education
is not known, it can be reported as missing. According to the reporting
rule, employers are supposed to report the highest degree attained by the
employee, not the degree required for the current job. As a consequence, the
sequence of education records should be nondecreasing over time because the
employees can only attain higher degrees over time, not lose them. Therefore,
a decreasing sequence violates this reporting rule and represents evidence for
inconsistent reporting behavior. If, instead, employers had to report the
educational degree required for the job, a decreasing sequence of education
records would not be inconsistent. All imputation procedures developed in
this paper provide a corrected education variable with consistent information
over time.
2.2 Spells with Missing Education
Table 1 (in the appendix) reports the distribution of the variable BILD in the
original data. As can be seen, 9.52% of the spells exhibit missing education
information. One might suspect that missing values are mostly a problem
concerning non-employment spells and short employment spells. Therefore,
we also calculate the distribution of the education variable among full time
working males in 1995 excluding apprentices and we weight the spells by their
length. Still a weighted share of 7.35% has missing education information.
Therefore, missing values are also a sizeable problem among employees.
Next, we investigate how the incidence of missing education information
among employees is related to other observed covariates in the IABS. We
estimate a probit modeling the probability of a missing education report
as a function of personal characteristics of the employee (age, sex, marital
status, and nationality), employment status, occupation,5 industry, number
of records the employer gave about this employee, length of the employment
spell, and year. The estimation is based on employment spells only. Table
2 displays the marginal effects on the probability of a missing report. Most
of the effects are significant but they are not very large compared to an
observed rate of 7.8% of missing information. Noteworthy are a 6.1 (SE
0.1) percentage points (ppoints) higher probability of a missing report for
foreigners relative to Germans, a 9.2 ppoints (SE 0.3) higher probability for
5We thank Alexandra Spitz for providing a convenient classification for occupations.
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part-time workers with less than half the regular hours compared to fulltime
salaried employees and considerable differences in reporting quality across
industries. Compared to the investment goods industry, the probability of a
missing report is 15.7 (SE 0.4) ppoints higher in consumer services and 10.8
(SE 0.3) ppoints higher in the main construction trade.
2.3 Changes in Education across Spells
Compared to missing information, changes in the education information re-
ported for a person across spells are more difficult to deal with since incorrect
information is not immediately apparent. Therefore, it is crucial to analyze
the sequence of reported education records across spells. If for a person first
a high degree and afterwards a low degree is reported, we know that this
sequence is inconsistent with the reporting rule, but we do not know which
report is incorrect. It can be the first one overreporting or the second one
underreporting or even both can be incorrect. But due to the panel nature
of the data, we can identify whether an entire sequence is consistent. In
the sample, 81.9% of the persons exhibit consistent sequences of education
information while 18.10% do not.
Example 1 shows a person with inconsistently reported education records.
Only spell 3 shows education TC but all later spells show lower education
with ND or VT or missing education. We do not know if the report of TC
is true, but the decrease in reported education afterwards shows that some
report violates the rule of reporting the highest attained degree. Either, what
seems likely in this example, the report of TC itself is wrong, or, in fact, the
employee holds the TC at spell 3. Then, all education reports at later spells
reporting lower education with ND or VT are wrong because TC is a higher
degree. In this example, there exists a second inconsistency. The report of
ND at spell 16 is lower than the report of VT at spell 15.
Some insights on the reporting behavior of employers can be gained by look-
ing at consecutive pairs of education records for the same employee. Overall,
in 91.5% of all cases, two consecutive reports are the same.6 But there is a
sharp difference depending on which employer issued the report. If both re-
ports are by the same employer, they coincide in 97.0% of the cases. However,
6The descriptive statistics in this section are based on employment spells only.
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SPELL BILD Education Employer Employed
1 1 ND 1 yes
2 1 ND 2 yes
3 5 TC 3 yes
4 1 ND 1 yes
5 1 ND 0 unemployed
6 1 ND 4 yes
7 2 VT 5 yes
8 2 VT 6 yes
9 2 VT 0 unemployed
10 2 VT 0 unemployed
11 -9 missing 7 yes
12 2 VT 8 yes
13 2 VT 0 unemployed
14 2 VT 9 yes
15 2 VT 9 yes
16 1 ND 10 yes
17 2 VT 9 yes
Example 1: Person with inconsistently reported education.
they are issued by two different employers, this rate amounts to only 63.2%.
The higher stability of reports by the same employer is to be expected for
the following reasons. First, attaining a higher degree often coincides with
changing the employer. The second explanation is rather technical and is
related to the artificial splitting of some employment spells in the IABS in
order to assure data privacy. This results in two consecutive spells by the
same employer with the same education information. Third, the much higher
stability of reports by the same employer may also indicate that employers
just replicate their previous reports causing serial correlation of reporting
errors for reports on the same employee by the same employer.
Furthermore, we investigate the conditional probabilities for reported educa-
tion conditional on the previous report for a given person. Such a transition
matrix is calculated for reports by the same employer in table 3 and for re-
ports from differing employers in table 4. The high numbers (above 93%
except for HS) on the diagonal in table 3 confirm that the same employer
is likely to repeat the report given before. When the reporting employer
changes, VT still has a probability of 76.9% to be repeated in the next record.
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The probability for UD to be repeated is 74.7%. This is not surprising since
VT and UD are likely to be the highest degrees people attain. The other
educational outcomes are, on the contrary, reported in a less stable way with
probabilities of being repeated reaching at most 55.1%.
When analyzing the probability of missing education reports we find large
differences between industries (cf. table 2). To explore further whether there
are similar patterns for inconsistent sequences of education reports we look
at the probability that consecutive pairs of education reports on the same
employee are inconsistent, i. e. the second report is lower than the first one.
Since with an inconsistent pair we do not know whether the first or the
second report is wrong, but only that at least one of them must be wrong,
we look at characteristics at the first and the second spell: employment
status, occupation, industry, spell length and number of reports by the same
employer on the employee in consideration. Additionally, we control for age,
sex, nationality, and year. The results of the probit regression can be found
in table 5. The covariates describing the employment status have the largest
coefficients. Working as a trainee (apprentice obtaining a VT) at the second
spell of the consecutive pair increases the probability of an inconsistent pair
by 4.9 ppoints (SE 0.09), relative to working as a salaried employee. This
compares to an observed total rate of 2.1% for all pairs. Working as a skilled
worker at the first spell of the pair leads to a 3.4 ppoints (SE 0.06) higher
probability of an inconsistent pair, again compared to working as as salaried
employee. Industry and nationality only weakly affect the probability of
inconsistent reports. This stands in sharp contrast with the influence that
these variables have on the probability of a missing report. In fact, being
foreign or working in the main construction trade or consumer services has a
strong positive influence. Section five returns to the question of inconsistent
reports, analyzing explicitly the incidence of underreports by comparing the
original data and the imputed data.
3 Imputation Procedures
This section develops three imputation procedures to improve the education
variable in the IABS. We first discuss the extrapolation of degrees, which is
a common feature of all imputation procedures, and then we describe the
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three imputation procedures in detail.
3.1 Extrapolation
All imputation procedures developed in this paper are based on the following
hypotheses:
(i) after having attained an educational degree, individuals keep their de-
gree,
(ii) the educational degree remains in general almost constant once a person
has entered working life and
(iii) employers have to report the highest attained degree.
Knowing when a person attained which educational degrees is sufficient to
construct the correct sequence of educational degrees for all spells. Therefore,
all imputation procedures extrapolate a valid educational degree observed
for some spell to all future spells if the future spells report a lower degree
or no degree at all until the person attains a higher valid degree or until the
last spell if the person does not attain any higher degree. The imputation
procedures developed below differ with respect to the heuristic rules applied
to determine the valid educational degrees to be extrapolated.
There are three possible types of reporting errors: underreporting education,
overreporting education, and not reporting education at all. The existence
of missing values is explained by employers who do not spend effort to get to
know the education of their employees. They report ”information cannot be
obtained”. The impact of these three types of errors varies substantially when
applying an extrapolation rule to the reported data. One has to distinguish
between extrapolating the misreported information to subsequent spells and
the extrapolation of previously reported information to the misreported spell.
Provided one starts with a valid educational degree, extrapolation will cor-
rect errors due to underreporting and missing information. However, overre-
ported spells have no chance of being corrected by extrapolating information
from previous spells. Furthermore, extrapolating an overreported degree will
acerbate the situation. Thus, applying the extrapolation rule to all reported
spells on the one hand reduces problems from underreported education or
10
missing information, but on the other hand, through a ratchet effect, poten-
tially increases problems with overreported education by extrapolating the
overreports to later spells. Put differently, a comprehensive application of
the extrapolation rule to the highest reported degrees is likely to yield an
upward bias by extrapolating overreported degrees.
Imputation procedure 1 (IP1) assumes that there is no overreporting and
therefore extrapolates the highest reported degrees. Based on the above
discussion, IP1 possibly overstates education through a ratched effect when
overreporting occurs. The imputation procedures 2 and 3 (IP2 and IP3) allow
for the possibility of overreporting. IP2 and IP3 use heuristic rules to iden-
tify valid education information in a conservative way. Only extrapolating
valid education information, there is a reduced risk of extrapolating a high
degree incorrectly. We argue that, by construction, IP1 tends to overreport
education whereas IP2 and IP3 tend to underreport education. Put together,
these imputation procedures provide benchmarks reflecting the range of the
true education information. If substantive results do not differ between IP1
and IP2 or IP3, we argue that they basically coincide with results obtained
for a correct measure of education.
The next subsections describe the imputation procedures IP1, IP2, and IP3
in detail. Their implementation comprises four steps. Step 1 defines which
spells are accepted as a basis for the extrapolation rule. Education infor-
mation from not accepted spells is treated as missing and will be imputed
by extrapolation from previous spells. Step 2 implements the extrapolation
rule from earlier to later spells. Step 3 involves backward extrapolation from
later to earlier spells. Step 4 contains further adjustments. The imputation
procedures differ only by the acceptance rules used in step 1.
3.2 Imputation Procedure 1 (IP1)
For a given person, IP1 extrapolates every degree which is reported for the
first time and is higher than the degrees reported previously. This procedure
is justified by the assumption that no overreporting errors occur because
the only source of misreports are those employers who report the degree
an employee needs for a certain job instead of the highest degree actually
attained by the employee. Either such employers just do not check whether
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the employee holds a higher degree than needed or they intentionally do not
report the higher attained degree, for instance, if the higher degree does not
correspond to the lower social status of the job.
For IP1, the extrapolation starts with the first report of a degree. Under the
assumption of no overreporting, underreporting of degrees and non-reporting
are the only problems. Then, the extrapolation of a (high) degree to spells
with missing or lower education information would be a conservative rule
that potentially understates true education. In fact, a degree could have
already been attained before its first record in the data or an even higher
degree as the one reported could have been attained. Since individuals in the
data are observed for quite a long time period and people rarely change their
education at higher ages, it is, however, likely that the true (or higher) edu-
cation level is reported eventually. Note that, in a second step, extrapolation
also proceeds backwards based on the assumption that people do not change
their education at higher ages. However, if there exists a certain probability
of overreporting, too, the potential extrapolation of overreports by IP1 may
lead to an overstatement of the true education. If there is a remaining bias,
we argue that the second effect is likely to dominate, because any plausible
sequence of educational records has to be nondecreasing (ratchet effect).
All together, IP1 consists of the following four steps.
Step 1: Extrapolation Rule
IP1 assumes that every first report of a new higher degree in an employment
spell is a valid information to be extrapolated subsequently. The level of
education in subsequent spells is imputed by extrapolating the most recent
valid report. All imputation procedures treat education reports in unemploy-
ment spells and other non-employment spells as missing information. The
actual extrapolation procedures in steps 2 and 3 will impute education in-
formation for the non-employment spells. We do not use information from
non-employment spells since it is not reported directly by an employer but
repeated from the most recent employment spell. The original data include
educational degrees for persons below the age of 18 years which often seem
implausible. Therefore, we impute ND for all spells in this age range.
Step 2: Forward Extrapolation
The extrapolation of education information to subsequent spells has to ac-
count for the fact that the degrees HS and VT cannot be ranked. When
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persons have both degrees this has to be explicitly reported. Hence, the ex-
trapolation rule imputes HSVT if one degree is accepted as a valid degree
for the first time with the other degree having been accepted before.
We implement the extrapolation rule based on valid degrees in the following
order. First, we extrapolate ND to subsequent spells with missing informa-
tion. Then, we extrapolate VT to subsequent spells with missing information
or no degree. Afterwards we extrapolate HS to subsequent spells with miss-
ing information or no degree. Now, we impute HSVT if HS is accepted for
the first time and VT has been accepted before or vice versa. Finally, we
extrapolate HSVT, TC, or UD to subsequent spells with lower or missing
information. As a result, degrees are extrapolated starting at the spell of
their first acceptance and stopping at the first spell where an even higher
degree is accepted.
Step 3: Backward Extrapolation
The forward extrapolation in step 2 leaves the education information missing
when spells with missing values precede spells with valid educational infor-
mation. Since the educational degree of a person is rather time constant,
we also extrapolate backwards the first valid educational degree to previous
spells with missing information. We do not extrapolate backwards degrees
beyond degree specific age limits, because the attainment of a certain degree
implies a certain amount of years of schooling. The age limits are the median
ages at which the degrees are reported for the first time for persons in the
data. We do not impute backwards UD below the age of 29 years, TC below
27 years, HSVT below 23 years, HS below 21 years, and VT below 20 years.
If the first information reported is ND, this is imputed to all spells before.
Note that the age limits imply that the first spells of young persons can
remain with missing information even if these persons at subsequent spells
have non-missing information.
Step 4: Additional adjustments
For persons with missing education information in all spells, we impute VT if
their employment status is skilled worker (Facharbeiter), foreman (Polier) or
master craftsman (Meister). This is justified by the fact that in almost 90%
of the cases with valid education information we observe the degree VT to-
gether such an employment status. Therefore, we impute VT for those cases.
Subsequently, we also extrapolate the imputed information VT forward and
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backwards analogous to steps 2 and 3.
If persons only have employment spells with other information on employ-
ment status and education is missing for all spells, we leave it at that.
The data contain a number of parallel spells for persons who hold two or
more jobs at the same time. If the imputed education variable so far takes
different values for parallel spells this is inconsistent with the reporting rule.
Hence, in a last step, we impute the highest education information among
the parallel spells to these parallel spells.
Example 2 illustrates the implementation of IP1.
SPELL BILD Education IP1 IP1 Education
1 -9 missing 2 VT
2 -9 missing 2 VT
3 -9 missing 2 VT
4 2 VT 2 VT
5 1 ND 2 VT
6 1 ND 2 VT
7 2 VT 2 VT
8 3 HS 4 HSVT
9 3 HS 4 HSVT
10 3 HS 4 HSVT
11 6 UD 6 UD
12 2 VT 6 UD
13 2 VT 6 UD
Example 2: IP1
The forward extrapolation (Step 2 ) extrapolates VT from spell 4 to spells
5 and 6, where the lower education level ND is reported. At spell 8, HS is
reported. With VT having been reported before, we assume both degrees,
HS and VT, are held and impute HSVT. HSVT is considered higher than
HS and extrapolated to spell 9 and 10. For spell 11, UD is reported. Even
though it is reported only once for this person, IP1 extrapolates UD to spells
12 and 13 because IP1 assumes no overreports occur. Forward extrapolation
alone would leave spells 1 to 3 with missing information. Hence (Step 3 ), we
extrapolate backwards VT from spell 4 to spells 1 to 3. It can be seen that the
imputed sequence is consistent (i. e. non-decreasing), which by construction
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is the case for all imputed data. In example 2, there is no missing information
left. This is not necessarily the case. For example, if there is only missing
education information, the person can be left with missing information after
the imputation procedures.
3.3 Imputation Procedure 2 (IP2)
IP2 does not rule out the possibility of overreporting. However, without ex-
ogenous information, it is not possible to identify spells with overstated edu-
cation. Instead IP2 uses heuristic rules to identify spells with valid education
information and spells with invalid information. Then, only valid education
information is used for extrapolation. Information from spells with invalid
education is treated as missing and the extrapolation rule imputes informa-
tion from earlier spells. The critical issue is to identify in a conservative way
spells which are likely to be overreported.
IP2 uses the frequency of reporting as an indicator for reliability. Educational
degrees which are frequently reported for the same person are likely to be
valid. Spells reporting degrees which are very rarely reported for this person
are considered incorrect. Concretely, we assume that, if a degree is reported
at least three times, then it is reliably reported. We extrapolate this degree
from the first time it is reported (if it is higher than the valid reports before).
If a degree is reported only once or twice we consider that it is not reliably
reported. Invalid information is treated as missing information, hence not
extrapolated but instead imputed with information from earlier spells.
When counting specific education reports, we only count employment spells,
not non-employment spells. This reflects the fact that only information at
employment spells is directly employer reported.
However, under certain circumstances, a low frequency of a specific report
arises quite naturally without indicating overreporting. One example involves
persons who attain a degree and soon afterwards attain a higher degree. An-
other example are degrees which are attained shortly before the panel ends.
However, this incorrect classification as unreliable spells is by construction
limited to two spells. Nevertheless, we try to quantify the problem by imple-
menting two versions of IP2, version IP2A and IP2B. IP2A strictly classifies
rarely reported information as invalid. IP2B does so only for persons with
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inconsistencies in their reported education. For persons with no inconsisten-
cies, even rare reports can be extrapolated analogously to IP1.
Compared to IP1, IP2A and IP2B yield possibly lower imputed educational
reports since not all reported higher degrees are extrapolated. By construc-
tion, imputed values for IP2B lie between IP1 and IP2A.
IP2A and IP2B proceed by the same four steps as described above for IP1.
The only differences involve step 1:
For extrapolation, IP2A accepts all employment spells as valid when the
reported degree is reported in at least three spells. If the total number
of employment spells for a person is only four, the minimum frequency for
acceptance is reduced to two reports. If there are less than four employment
spells, educational information in every employment spell is treated as valid.
IP2B uses the same heuristic rule for extrapolation as IP2A but only for
persons with an inconsistent sequence of educational reports in the original
data. For persons with a consistent sequence, all employment spells are
accepted as a basis for extrapolation.
Both IP2A and IP2B do not accept degrees for persons below the age of
18 but impute ND instead. For young persons below the age of 23 years in
vocational training the educational information no degree or only high school
degree is accepted even without being reported frequently enough.
Example 3 illustrates the implementation of IP2A.
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SPELL BILD Education Employed Frequency of IP2A IP2A
report Education
1 1 ND yes 7 1 ND
2 1 ND yes 1 ND
3 5 TC yes 1 1 ND
4 1 ND yes 1 ND
5 1 ND yes 1 ND
6 2 VT yes 3 2 VT
7 2 VT unemployed 2 VT
8 2 VT yes 2 VT
9 2 VT yes 2 VT
10 -9 missing yes 2 VT
11 1 ND yes 2 VT
12 1 ND yes 2 VT
13 1 ND yes 2 VT
Example 3: IP2A
First, it is determined which degrees are reported at least three times to be
valid for extrapolation. ND is reported seven times and hence valid. TC
is only reported once. Thus, spell 3 will be treated as a spell with missing
information. VT is reported in three employment spells and hence also con-
sidered as valid. Actually, it is reported four times in the example, but spell
7 is an unemployment spell just repeating information from spell 6. Hence,
spell 7 is treated as a spell with missing information. Now, extrapolation can
proceed. ND is extrapolated from spell 2 to spell 3 previously containing the
invalid TC report. VT is extrapolated from spell 9 to spell 10 with missing
information and spells 11-13 with the lower report of ND. Since the reported
information in this example is inconsistent, IP2B would proceed the same
way.
3.4 Imputation Procedure 3 (IP3)
Analogously to IP2, IP3 does not rule out the possibility of overreporting.
Again, in a first step, a heuristic rule is applied to identify spells with valid
education information and spells with invalid information. Then, in subse-
quent steps, only valid education information is considered for extrapolation.
As an alternative approach to takeing the observed frequency of an educa-
tional degree as an indicator of its reliability, we now discriminate between
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a series of reports issued by a single employer and reports coming from dif-
ferent employers. The rationale behind this is the hypothesis that employers
do not reevaluate the educational degree of their employees every time they
have to give a report but tend to copy from previous reports. If the reporting
errors made by individual employers are serially correlated, degrees reported
repeatedly by different employers can be considered more reliable than de-
grees reported repeatedly by the same employer. Tables 3 and 4 might be
interpreted this way. Put differently, under this scenario, every change in
the educational degree reported for a given person, may reveal us additional
information about the reliability of the employer issuing the report and/or
the likely true education of the employee.
IP3 is based on an explicit hypothesis about the reporting behavior of the
employers. The procedure distinguishes between reliable information from
employers who report carefully and unreliable information from employers
who do not report carefully. Employers who at most once change the infor-
mation they report about an employee are classified as reliable. Employers
who change the reported degree for a given employee twice or more often are
classified as unreliable. This classification is justified by the fact that the
educational degree is typically constant for most people during most of their
working life. It is not very likely for an employee to attain two (or more)
higher degrees while being employed with the same employer.7
Furthermore, IP3 tries to explicitly take into account self correction by an
employer. We allow for two types of self corrected reporting errors. The
first type consists of errors corrected immediately: an employer changes the
reported degree only for one spell and immediately afterwards switches back
to the degree reported before. In this case, we proceed as if the one time
deviation in reporting behavior has never occurred and do not count two but
zero changes. Hence, the employer still can be classified as reliable. The
second type of self corrected reporting errors concerns reliable employers. If
they inconsistently change their report from a higher degree to a lower de-
gree, we interpret this as a valid correction by the employer who actually
always intended to report the lower degree. We proceed by assuming that
7In our data set, we cannot identify whether different employees are employed by the
same employer. We can only identify which of a person’s employment spells are with the
same employer. Thus, we only evaluate the reporting behavior of an employer concerning
a specific employee.
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the employer always reported the lower degree. If a reliable employer perma-
nently changes to a higher degree we interpret this as the actual attainment
of the higher degree.
Now, we start extrapolating a degree when it is reported for the first time by
a reliable employer unless the employer did not intend to report this higher
degree as a consequence of self correction. In the latter case, we first impute
the intended lower degree which becomes the basis for extrapolation.
Again, compared to IP1, IP3 yields potentially lower imputed educational
reports since not all reported higher degrees are extrapolated. In this respect,
one cannot rank IP3 relative to IP2A or IP2B.
Furthermore, IP3 proceeds by the same four steps as described above for IP1,
IP2A, and IP2B. The only differences regard step 1.
For a given individual, IP3 preliminarily accepts all employment spells with
non-missing education information which are the first reports of a given em-
ployer and, in addition, all employment spells by the same employer whenever
the reported degree changes. When a change occurs, the type of reporting
error is classified. If there is an immediate self correction, we impute the
intended report in the deviating spell. Then, if we count not more than one
change in the reported degree, the respective employer is classified as reliable.
Otherwise, the employer is classified as unreliable and his reports are set to
missing. Next, inconsistent reports by reliable employers are corrected in the
spells which were first accepted. As in all other procedures, we impute spells
from persons below the age of 18 with ND.
¿From this point onwards, extrapolation proceeds as for the other imputation
procedures.
Example 4 illustrates the implementation of IP3.
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SPELL BILD Education Employer Employer Intended IP3 IP3
reliable report Education
1 1 ND 1 yes 1 1 ND
2 1 ND 1 1 1 ND
3 2 VT 1 2 2 VT
4 2 VT 2 no 2 VT
5 3 HS 2 2 VT
6 4 HSVT 2 2 VT
7 2 VT 3 yes 2 2 VT
8 4 HSVT 3 2 2 VT
9 2 VT 3 2 2 VT
10 2 VT 3 2 2 VT
11 4 HSVT 3 4 4 HSVT
12 6 UD 4 yes 5 5 TC
13 5 TC 4 5 5 TC
14 5 TC 4 5 5 TC
15 5 TC 4 5 5 TC
16 4 HSVT 5 yes 4 5 TC
17 4 HSVT 5 4 5 TC
Example 4: IP3
Before extrapolation can take place the reliability of the employers has to be
determined and self corrected reporting errors have to be detected. Employer
1 changes the reported information once and is hence reliable. Employer 2
changes the reported information twice, thus he is not reliable. His spells
(3-6) are treated as spells with missing information. Employer 3 seems to
change the reported level of education three times. But we interpret the
report of HSVT at spell 8 as an immediate correction of a one time misreport
because VT is reported by this employer at spells 7 and 9. Hence, we count
only one change and classify this employer as reliable. We conclude that he
intended to report VT at spells 7-10 and HSVT at spell 11. Employer 4
changes the reported degree once and is hence reliable. But the report of
TC after UD is inconsistent. IP3 assumes this to be a self correction and
that employer 4 always intended to report TC. Employer 5 never changes
the reported education and is classified as reliable. Now, extrapolation can
take place on the basis of the reliable employer’s intended reports (i. e. after
taking account of the self correction of reporting errors at spell 8 and 12).
VT is extrapolated from spell 3 to spells 4-6. TC is extrapolated from spell
15 to spells 16 and 17.
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4 Applications
This section compares the corrected education data resulting from the dif-
ferent imputation procedures to the original data. First, we analyze the
distribution of the education variable. Second, we look at wage inequality
between and within skill groups. Third, we investigate the impact on estimat-
ing a wage regression with education as explanatory variable. Furthermore
we analyze the incidence of underreports.
4.1 Education Mix in Employment
Table 6 shows the education shares for the original data and for the respective
imputed data resulting from procedures IP1, IP2A, IP2B, and IP3 where the
shares have been calculated based on the raw spells, i. e. all unweighted
spells. To assess the relevance of the imputation procedure for practical
applications, table 7 reports education shares for men working fulltime 1995
in West Germany weighted by the spell length. The tables show that all
procedures could eliminate most of the missing values. Their share decreases
from 9.5% to 1.9-3.2% of the raw spells. Considering the weighted sample, we
see a similar picture at a lower level. The share of missing values decreases
from 7.4% to 1.2-2.1%. The remaining missing values can be explained by two
reasons: (i) persons with all education information missing and (ii) the age
limits for backwards extrapolation of degrees. The imputation procedures do
not only reduce the share of missing information but also the share of ND and
HS. The shares of the education groups VT, HSVT, TC, and UD increase for
the raw spells as well as for the weighted data. Next we discuss the results
for the weighted data in more detail. The by far largest increase in absolute
terms concerns the category VT with an increase of 5.6-6.9 ppoints (added to
65.3% initially). HSVT shows the largest increase in relative terms: +1.1-2.4
ppoints (added to 2.7% initially). Considering the higher education levels,
UD gains more (+0.8-1.3 ppoints added to 5.0% initially) than TC: 0.4-0.7
ppoints added to 4.0% initially. The decrease in ND is 2.5-5.0 ppoints from
15.1%. The size and change of HS is small.
The imputation procedures decrease the shares of ND and HS and result in
a higher educational attainment among employed workers. The share of the
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employees holding any degree is higher (lower share of ND) and the share of
the higher educational levels (TC, UD) is higher.
Comparing the different imputation procedures, IP1 shows the strongest im-
pact on the educational composition. IP1 results in the highest shares of the
higher education categories (HSVT, TC, UD) which is to be expected since
it potentially extrapolates any higher report. IP2A changes the educational
composition least strongly. The resulting shares of the high education cat-
egories (HSVT, TC, UD) are the lowest. IP2B is comparable to procedure
IP2A except for a lower share of missing information and a higher share of
VT. IP3 gives shares which are roughly in the middle between procedure
IP1 and procedure IP2A. This shows that our acceptance rules based on fre-
quency are stricter than the acceptance rule based on the reliability of the
employer.
Are the differences between the imputed data from the procedures small
compared to the difference to the original data? This would imply that
it is important to use an imputation rule, but not that important which
one. Certainly the differences between the different imputed data are small
concerning the missing values and VT. For the other categories the differences
are also not to large except for the small category of HSVT. Its share goes
up from 2.7% to between 3.8% (IP2A) and 5.1% (IP1). For this category,
the differences between the procedures are not negligible.
Additional insights on how the different procedures work can be gained from
looking at the conditional imputation probabilities for the different educa-
tion categories given the reported education. These imputation matrices are
reported in tables 8 to 11 based on the raw spells because the procedures
are based on unweighted employment spells. The tables are transformation
matrices in which the diagonal elements give the probability an original re-
port remains unchanged by the imputation procedure and the off diagonal
elements in each row give the probability it is imputed with one of the other
education categories. All procedures impute spells containing missing infor-
mation with ND in about 25% of all cases and with VT in about 50% of all
cases. The large values on the diagonals in the tables show that all proce-
dures leave at least 73% of the non-missing reports unchanged. Reports from
the largest category VT are rarely changed, with the procedures leaving more
than 95.6% unchanged. Only UD reports are changed less often, more than
97.1% of them are unchanged. HS reports exhibit the highest rate of being
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imputed with other information. They remain unchanged with a rate of only
73.0-77.1% and, if changed, they are most likely to be imputed with HSVT
in 9.9-18.9% of the cases. ND reports are quite likely to be changed, too.
77.4-83.7% of them are unchanged. 15.7-21.3% are imputed with VT. Even if
the broad picture looks similar there are differences between the procedures.
Only IP1’s entries below the diagonal are all close to zero. This reflects the
fact that every reported non-missing degree is used for extrapolation under
the assumption of no overreporting. Procedures IP2 and IP3, on the con-
trary, do not extrapolate every degree but some reported degrees classified as
unreliable are imputed with lower degrees. This mainly concerns HS which
is in 1.3-4.4% of the spells imputed with ND and in 4.5-6.1% with VT. This
also concerns HSVT reports. Those reports stand a 3.3-5.7% chance of being
imputed with VT.
In the literature, the six educational categories are often aggregated into
three groups: (U) without a vocational training degree [ND and HS], (M)
with a vocational training degree [VT and HSVT], and (H) with a higher
educational degree [TC and UD] (see for instance Fitzenberger, 1999). This
makes imputations within these groups irrelevant but tables 8 to 11 show a
considerable number of imputations taking place across the groups U, M, and
H, like the imputation of VT to ND. Hence, the imputation procedures are
relevant at the more aggregated level as well. But the aggregation reduces
the differences concerning the educational distribution, since the small group
HSVT with the largest differences is aggregated with VT.
4.2 Wage Inequality Between and Within Education
Groups
Now, we investigate the impact of the imputation procedures on measures of
wage inequality between and within skill groups. For illustrative purposes,
we focus on wage inequality among men working full time in West Germany
and only consider two years, 1984 and 1997. We aggregate the six educa-
tion categories into three skill groups, U, M, and H, as described in the last
subsection. Table 12 shows the 20th, the 50th and the 80th percentile of
the daily wage (in German Marks/DEM) for men in 1984 and in 1997 by
the skill groups U, M and H. For the high skilled H, the 50th and the 80th
percentiles cannot be calculated since wages are right censored in the data
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at the social security threshold. The table shows that the percentiles of the
daily wage estimated with the imputed data are in most cases some DEM
lower compared to those calculated with the original data. In 1984, this
only concerns the wage percentiles for the skill groups M and H, which are
estimated 1 to 4 DEM lower with the imputed data than with the original
data (originally 90-143 DEM). In 1997, this concerns all skill groups, the
estimated daily wage percentiles are up to 9 DEM lower for the imputed
data. Lower estimated wage percentiles resulting from the imputed data are
consistent with our view that there are many more underreports than overre-
ports and underreports are associated with employees holding degrees which
employers do not consider necessary for the job. Therefore, employees with
underreports earn less than employees holding the same, correctly reported
degree.
As a measure of wage inequality between skill groups, we consider the differ-
ence in log daily wages between the skill groups M and U at the 50th and the
20th percentiles and between the skill groups H and M only at the 20th wage
percentile due to censoring of the higher wages. The numbers are given in
table 13. Imputing the education variable has a notable influence on the es-
timates of wage inequality between the low skilled U and the medium skilled
M at the 20th wage percentile. In 1984, the estimate is lower with 0.095 for
all procedures instead of 0.118 and in 1997 the estimate is higher, i. e. 0.168
to 0.219 compared to 0.163. Since the differences go in the opposite direction
the estimated 1984-97 change in wage inequality for this group rises consid-
erably from 0.045 to 0.073-0.124. But note the large differences between the
procedures in the 1997 estimates, and hence also in the trend estimates. The
estimated inequality measures between U and M at the 50th and between H
and M at the 20th wage percentile and the respective trends are not changed
in a systematic way, however, there are noticeable differences as well.
Table 14 reports wage inequality within the skill groups U and M. It shows
the differences in log wages between the 80th and the 50th wage percentiles
as well as the differences between the 50th and the 20th percentiles. Overall,
the largest impact of the imputation procedures on measured inequality can
be found in 1997 for skill group U below the median: the 50%-20% log wage
difference is measured as 0.257-0.269 instead of 0.228 where the results of
the different imputation procedures are quite close. The other measured
within group wage inequalities are changed less than half that much, at most
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by 0.014. Concerning the trend between 1984 and 1997, the largest change
can also be observed for the 50%-20% log wage difference for skill group U.
Whereas the original data result in an increase of 0.036, the imputed show
a larger increase of 0.065-0.086. The measured trend for U and M above the
median is almost not affected by the imputation procedures: the growth in
the 80%-50% log wage difference for M shows a slightly smaller value with
0.003-0.014 compared to 0.021 for the original data.
Summing up, imputation affects only some measures of wage inequality, es-
pecially in the lower part of the wage distribution.
4.3 Mincer-type Earnings Regressions
This subsection investigates the effects of imputing education on estimated
wage regressions. Furthermore, we investigate whether and how the mea-
surement error in education is related to wages. We estimate the following
Mincer-type earnings equation (Mincer, 1974):
logw = α + βNDdND + βHSdHS + βHSV TdHSV T
+βTCdTC + βUNdUN + βX + ε
where logw is the log daily wage for fulltime employed men in West Ger-
many in 1995. The education variables are dummies for five categories, the
most frequent category VT is the omitted category. We also control for age
and age squared in X. Since wages are censored from above at the social
security threshold, we estimate a Tobit model. The results without further
controls are given in table 15. It can be seen that the coefficients for ND,
TC, and UN do not differ much between the original data and the different
versions of the imputed data. The differences are below 8.7% of the coef-
ficient obtained based on the original data. But the differences are partly
significant due to small standard errors.8 The intercept as a measure for the
8We do not estimate the sampling variance of the difference when applying the different
imputation procedures. However, if the sample variance of the coefficient is small in all
cases then the variance of the difference is small because of the Cauchy-Schwarz-Inequality.
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VT log wage also does not seem to differ significantly. But the coefficients
for the smaller education categories HS and HSVT change. The difference
is largest for HSVT between the original data and the data based on IP1,
the coefficients are 0.196 (SE 0.007)9 and 0.123 (0.005), respectively. IP3
gives results comparable to IP1 and IP2 gives results between IP1 and the
original data. The coefficient for HS does not differ significantly due to large
standard errors.
We have repeated the estimations with additional controls for being foreign,
six occupations and 13 industries (see table 16). The picture remains quali-
tatively the same. The additional controls reduce the coefficients in absolute
value for the log wage differences. Again the coefficients for ND, TC, and
UN are quite comparable. The intercept does not differ notably. The coef-
ficients on HS differ but not significantly. The coefficients on HSVT again
differ significantly. It is 0.086 (0.006) for the original data and differs most
strongly for IP1 with 0.035 (0.005).
Regarding these regressions, the impact of correcting the education variable
is fairly small. This is somewhat surprising since in tables 8-11 the composi-
tion of the individual education categories differs between the original data
and the imputed data. For instance, with probability 21.3%, IP1 classifies
a spell with reported education ND as VT. It is not surprising that the im-
putation procedures do not change the intercepts as estimates for the log
wage for VT given the large size of this group and the low rate of change for
spells reporting VT initially. The difference is largest for HSVT which is the
education category affected most by the imputation procedures.
Finally, we analyze the relationship between the individual wage and the in-
cidence and the type of misreport. This is of some importance since wage es-
timations in the spirit of Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999), which take misclas-
sification explicitly into account, require conditional (mean) independence of
wages and measurement error given true education. We can explore whether
this assumption is likely to hold by assuming true education to be somewhere
close to one of the corrected values. Then, we construct a missing dummy,
which is one if the education information in the original data is missing, an
overreport dummy, which is one if the report in the original data is higher,
and an analogous underreport dummy. If measurement error is independent
9Here and in the following standard error in parentheses.
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of the wage conditional on the true education, the dummies for the measure-
ment error types should have insignificant coefficients in the wage regressions
with the improved data. The regression controls for being foreign, occupa-
tion and industry since the incidence of missing education information was
shown above to be correlated with some of these variables.
The results can be found in table 17. The coefficient for a missing report
varies between -0.097 (0.005) and -0.114 (0.004). The coefficients for under-
reported education are of similar size with values between -0.104 (0.004) and
-0.116 (0.003). The coefficient on overreported education varies across the
different imputation procedures. For IP1, it is -0.331 (0.011). This must
be due to a very small number of outliers, because IP1 in general does not
allow for overreports. For IP2A and IP2B, the coefficients are -0.180 (0.012)
and -0.211 (0.017). For IP3, the coefficient on overreported education is in-
significant. If we are willing to assume that the true education is not too far
from one of the imputed education variables, we can conclude that an un-
derreported or not reported education is associated with a 10% lower wage
given the true education. A lower wage, when education is underreported,
is in accordance with the hypothesis that some employers report the edu-
cation required for the job, not the degree attained by the employee. They
pay a wage corresponding to the lower reported education. The evidence on
overreported education is not conclusive. It seems that measurement error
and wage are not conditionally independent given the true education. There-
fore, potential alternatives to imputation suggested in the literature are not
applicable here.
4.4 Underreports and Overreports
This section returns to the question of incorrect education reports. Compar-
ing the imputed data and the original data for employment spells in West
Germany, the share of underreports lies between 5.8% (IP2A) and 8.8% (IP1)
and the share of overreports between 0.2% (IP1) and 1.0% (IP2A). Underre-
ports are quantitatively as important as missing values, whereas overreports
are much less frequent. For this reason and because overreports differ by
construction according to the different imputation procedures, we focus on
underreports in the following.
The incidence of underreports is analyzed by comparing the reported educa-
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tion to the imputed education from IP2A in a probit regression with the set
of regressors also used when analyzing missing education reports (see table
2). The marginal effects are reported in table 18. As the largest effect, we
find a 5.7 ppoints (0.1) higher probability of an underreport for a non-skilled
worker compared to a salaried employee. If the report comes from an em-
ployer who gives only one or two reports about this employee, the probability
of an underreport is 3.7 ppoints (0.1) higher than when the employer gives
more than five reports. Possibly, employers who anticipate employing a per-
son only for a short time spend less effort reporting correctly. The effect of
working in the main construction trade is also quite large, with a 2.6 ppoints
(0.2) higher probability than in the investment goods industry. Note that,
for the probability of a missing report, the effect of this industry is four
times as large (see table 2) and, analyzing inconsistencies in table 5, there
are almost no industry effects. In contrast to what we found for missing
reports, foreigners are less likely to have underreports. The results for the
other imputation procedures are quite comparable.10
5 Conclusions
The education variable in the IAB employment subsample shows two appar-
ent shortcomings: missing data and observed data which is inconsistent with
the reporting rule for the variable. Based on the notion that the education
variable should represent a person’s highest degree, that the educational de-
gree of a working person is rather time constant, and that people can only
attain degrees over time, but not lose them, we propose different procedures
to improve the variable by deductive imputation. There is no exogenous in-
formation to validate our imputation procedures. Using plausible hypotheses
on the reporting process, we argue that our basic imputation procedure is
likely to overstate true education and our two other refinements are likely
to understate true education. If the results of the procedures come close to
each other, this should give credibility to our approach. In order to evaluate
the impact of imputing the education variable, we analyze the educational
distribution of employment as well as wage inequality between and within
10The results for the other imputation procedures are not displayed in the paper but
can be made available on request.
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skill groups, and we compare wage regressions using the original data and
the corrected data.
Imputation removes more than two thirds of the missing values. The cor-
rected data are by construction consistent with the reporting rule. Concern-
ing the education distribution of employment, the improvement of the data
matters. All procedures give higher shares for vocational (with or without a
high school degree), technical college, and university degrees and lower shares
for no degree or high school only. The resulting shares do not differ a lot in
size between the procedures, except for the small category vocational train-
ing plus high school. In most dimensions, wage inequality is only slightly
affected by the imputation procedures. But for the unskilled the measured
growth from 1984 to 1997 in the difference between the median wage and the
20th wage percentile is considerably higher compared to the original data. In
Mincer-type wage regressions, improving the data makes only a small differ-
ence, except again for the small category vocational training plus high school.
However, wages for three skill groups are typically lower at all degrees when
using the imputed data.
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Appendix
Table 1: Distribution of Education Variable BILD in the Original
Data
Education (abbreviation)a Coded as Number Share Weighted shareb
of spells of spells Empl. men 1995
Missing -9 819,701 9.52 7.35
No vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
(ND)
1 2,325,379 27.00 15.13
Only vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
(VT)
2 4,794,512 55.66 65.28
Only high school degree, no
vocational training degree
(HS)
3 95,955 1.11 0.59
High school degree and
vocational training degree
(HSVT)
4 153,728 1.78 2.69
Technical college degree
(TC)
5 175,603 2.04 3.97
University degree (UD) 6 249,180 2.89 4.98
Total 8,614,058 100.00 100.00
Notes: a In German, vocational training degree means abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung,
high school degree Abitur, technical college degree Fachhochschulabschluss and university
degree Hochschulabschluss.
b Weighted Share describes the education reported for fulltime working males in West
Germany 1995. Apprentices are not included. Employment spells are weighted by their
length.
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Table 2: Probit Regression of Education Information Missing
Regressors Marg eff Robust SE Regressors Marg eff Robust SE
≤19 years -0.018 (0.001)** spell≤30 days 0.023 (0.001)**
30-39 years 0.014 (0.001)** 30<spell≤180 days 0.015 (0.000)**
40-49 years 0.019 (0.001)** 1-2 reports by empl 0.038 (0.001)**
50-59 years 0.021 (0.001)** 3-5 reports by empl 0.023 (0.001)**
60+ years 0.024 (0.002)** year 75 0.009 (0.001)**
female -0.002 (0.001)** year 76 0.008 (0.001)**
married -0.009 (0.001)** year 77 0.005 (0.001)**
foreign 0.061 (0.001)** year 78 0.005 (0.001)**
trainee -0.039 (0.001)** year 79 0.005 (0.001)**
non-skilled worker 0.040 (0.001)** year 80 0.002 (0.001)**
skilled worker -0.023 (0.001)** year 81 0.001 (0.001)
master craftsman/forman -0.034 (0.002)** year 82 0.001 (0.001)
home worker 0.129 (0.012)** year 83 0.000 (0.001)
part time ≤18h 0.092 (0.003)** year 84 0.000 (0.000)
part time >18h 0.028 (0.001)** year 86 -0.000 (0.000)
farmers/farm managers 0.011 (0.002)** year 87 0.000 (0.001)
service workers 0.019 (0.001)** year 88 0.001 (0.001)
sales workers -0.016 (0.001)** year 89 0.002 (0.001)**
clerical workers -0.028 (0.001)** year 90 0.005 (0.001)**
admin/profes/techn staff -0.020 (0.001)** year 91 0.007 (0.001)**
agriculture 0.014 (0.003)** year 92 0.008 (0.001)**
basic industry 0.015 (0.002)** year 93 0.010 (0.001)**
consumer goods industry 0.018 (0.002)** year 94 0.012 (0.001)**
food industry 0.045 (0.002)** year 95 0.013 (0.001)**
main construction trade 0.108 (0.003)** year 96 0.013 (0.001)**
construction completion trade 0.054 (0.003)** year 97 0.015 (0.001)**
trade 0.060 (0.002)**
transport and communication 0.084 (0.003)**
business services 0.090 (0.002)**
consumer services 0.157 (0.004)**
education, non profit org 0.022 (0.002)**
public administration 0.026 (0.002)**
Observed prob 0.078
Predicted prob at x¯ 0.057
N 6,369,039
Pseudo R2 0.123
Notes: Dependent variable: dummy for reported education missing. Estimation based on
all employment spells in West Germany. Base category: 20-29 years, male, not married,
German, working fulltime as a salaried employee, occupation group Operatives/craft,
investment goods industry, more than five reports by the employer about the employee,
spell longer than 180 days, 1985. Intercept included in estimation. Robust standard
errors with clustering at the person level. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Conditional Probabilities of Education Reported Given
Previous Report by the Same Employer
Education repor- Education reported later by the same employer
ted previously Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD
Missing 94.43 1.68 3.47 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.13
ND 0.35 93.73 5.76 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.01
VT 0.26 0.69 98.86 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.03
HS 0.36 1.31 4.38 87.25 5.74 0.42 0.55
HSVT 0.34 0.35 2.26 0.21 96.15 0.32 0.37
TC 0.17 0.10 0.98 0.06 0.20 98.18 0.31
UD 0.15 0.05 0.46 0.06 0.11 0.23 98.94
Total 6.87 25.51 59.27 0.98 1.90 2.36 3.10
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities that the row education will be
reported for a person given the previous report for the person was the column education
and was reported by the same employer. Based on all employment spells.
Table 4: Conditional Probabilities of Education Reported Given
Previous Report by a Different Employer
Education repor- Education reported later by different employer
ted previously Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD
Missing 35.65 25.27 34.96 0.91 1.14 0.84 1.23
ND 12.48 53.12 31.62 1.16 0.70 0.46 0.47
VT 8.75 10.81 76.91 0.49 1.45 0.92 0.68
HS 7.92 15.94 23.12 25.61 10.52 5.10 11.80
HSVT 7.45 4.19 35.13 2.23 37.91 5.57 7.51
TC 5.70 1.89 21.77 1.05 5.35 55.08 9.17
UD 4.66 0.82 9.46 1.01 4.11 5.28 74.66
Total 12.84 24.34 54.71 1.19 2.08 1.88 2.96
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities that the row education will be
reported for a person given the previous report for the person was the column education
and was reported by a different employer. Based on all employment spells.
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Table 5: Probit Regression of Inconsistent Reports
Regressors Marg eff Robust SE Regressors Marg eff Robust SE
≤19 years -0.0071 (0.0001)** food industry -0.0006 (0.0003)
30-39 years 0.0005 (0.0001)** main construction trade 0.0062 (0.0004)**
40-49 years -0.0007 (0.0001)** construction completion trade 0.0012 (0.0004)**
50-59 years -0.0025 (0.0001)** trade -0.0002 (0.0002)
60+ years -0.0049 (0.0002)** transport and communication -0.0043 (0.0002)**
female -0.0002 (0.0001) business services 0.0019 (0.0003)**
married -0.0026 (0.0001)** consumer services -0.0001 (0.0003)
foreign -0.0013 (0.0001)** education, non profit org 0.0031 (0.0003)**
spell≤30 days 0.0059 (0.0002)** public administration 0.0025 (0.0004)**
30<spell≤180 days 0.0103 (0.0001)** agriculture (t-1) -0.0021 (0.0004)**
spell≤30 days (t-1) 0.0087 (0.0002)** basic industry (t-1) -0.0010 (0.0003)**
30<spell≤180 days (t-1) 0.0085 (0.0001)** consumer goods industry (t-1) 0.0004 (0.0003)
1-2 reports by empl 0.0065 (0.0002)** food industry (t-1) 0.0008 (0.0003)*
3-5 reports by empl -0.0004 (0.0001)* main construction trade (t-1) -0.0013 (0.0003)**
1-2 reports by empl (t-1) 0.0214 (0.0003)** construction compl trade (t-1) -0.0009 (0.0003)**
3-5 reports by empl (t-1) 0.0094 (0.0002)** trade (t-1) 0.0018 (0.0002)**
trainee 0.0486 (0.0009)** transport and comm (t-1) 0.0092 (0.0005)**
non-skilled worker 0.0331 (0.0006)** business services (t-1) 0.0012 (0.0003)**
skilled worker -0.0154 (0.0001)** consumer services (t-1) 0.0023 (0.0004)**
master craftsman/forman -0.0089 (0.0001)** education, non profit org (t-1) -0.0036 (0.0002)**
home worker 0.0278 (0.0034)** public administration (t-1) -0.0038 (0.0002)**
part time ≤18h 0.0227 (0.0008)** year 75 0.0014 (0.0005)**
part time >18h 0.0096 (0.0004)** year 76 -0.0007 (0.0003)**
trainee (t-1) -0.0098 (0.0001)** year 77 0.0015 (0.0003)**
non-skilled worker (t-1) -0.0109 (0.0001)** year 78 0.0030 (0.0003)**
skilled worker (t-1) 0.0338 (0.0006)** year 79 0.0019 (0.0003)**
master craftsman/f (t-1) 0.0225 (0.0015)** year 80 0.0026 (0.0003)**
home worker (t-1) -0.0049 (0.0007)** year 81 0.0022 (0.0003)**
part time ≤18h (t-1) -0.0032 (0.0002)** year 82 0.0020 (0.0003)**
part time >18h (t-1) -0.0041 (0.0002)** year 83 0.0003 (0.0003)
farmers/farm managers 0.0021 (0.0006)** year 84 0.0001 (0.0003)
service workers 0.0023 (0.0003)** year 86 0.0002 (0.0003)
sales workers -0.0056 (0.0002)** year 87 -0.0003 (0.0003)
clerical workers -0.0037 (0.0002)** year 88 -0.0004 (0.0003)
admin/profes/techn staff -0.0071 (0.0002)** year 89 -0.0005 (0.0002)*
farmers/farm man (t-1) 0.0031 (0.0006)** year 90 0.0003 (0.0003)
service workers (t-1) -0.0009 (0.0002)** year 91 0.0002 (0.0003)
sales workers (t-1) 0.0112 (0.0005)** year 92 -0.0007 (0.0002)**
clerical workers (t-1) 0.0078 (0.0004)** year 93 -0.0006 (0.0002)*
admin/profes/techn (t-1) 0.0191 (0.0005)** year 94 -0.0011 (0.0002)**
agriculture 0.0006 (0.0005) year 95 -0.0012 (0.0002)**
basic industry 0.0010 (0.0003)** year 96 -0.0025 (0.0002)**
consumer goods industry 0.0017 (0.0003)** year 97 -0.0038 (0.0002)**
Observed prob 0.0213 N 5,474,652
Predicted prob at x¯ 0.0106 Pseudo R2 0.2092
Notes: Dependent variable: dummy for reported education lower than in the previous report. (t-1)
indicates variables concerning the previous employment spell. Estimation based on all employment spells
in West Germany. Base category: 20-29 years, male, not married, German, working fulltime as a salaried
employee, occupation group Operatives/craft, investment goods industry, more than five reports by the
employer about the employee, spell longer than 180 days, 1985. Intercept included in estimation. Robust
standard errors with clustering at the person level. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Distribution of Education Variable after Imputation, Un-
weighted Spells
Education original data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
Missing 9.52 1.90 3.10 2.09 3.24
No vocational training de-
gree, no High School degree
27.00 23.41 25.68 25.80 24.09
Only vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
55.66 63.78 62.13 62.89 62.77
Only high school degree, no
vocational training degree
1.11 1.07 1.03 1.06 1.03
High school degree and vo-
cational training degree
1.78 3.63 2.47 2.54 2.99
Technical college degree 2.04 2.61 2.30 2.32 2.45
University degree 2.89 3.60 3.28 3.30 3.43
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: Shares based on all 8,614,058 spells.
Table 7: Distribution of Education Variable after Imputation,
Weighted Male Employment in 1995
Education Original data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
Missing 7.35 1.18 2.09 1.28 2.01
No vocational training de-
gree, no High School degree
15.13 10.14 12.61 12.52 11.14
Only vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
65.28 72.15 70.83 71.59 71.60
Only high school degree, no
vocational training degree
0.59 0.46 0.54 0.55 0.52
High school degree and vo-
cational training degree
2.69 5.05 3.76 3.83 4.21
Technical college degree 3.97 4.71 4.37 4.40 4.49
University degree 4.98 6.32 5.81 5.84 6.03
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: The table describes the education mix for men in West Germany working fulltime
in 1995. Apprentices are not included. Spells are weighted by their length.
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Table 8: Imputation Matrix for Procedure IP1
Imputed data
Original data Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD Total
Missing 19.61 24.77 49.30 0.87 2.50 1.38 1.57 100.00
ND 0.04 77.41 21.29 0.47 0.58 0.12 0.09 100.00
VT 0.03 0.27 95.83 0.00 2.56 0.83 0.47 100.00
HS 0.03 0.64 0.04 76.84 18.91 1.26 2.29 100.00
HSVT 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.01 89.64 5.04 5.14 100.00
TC 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 92.39 7.50 100.00
UD 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 99.92 100.00
Total 1.90 23.41 63.78 1.07 3.63 2.61 3.60 100.00
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities the column information will be
imputed given the spell originally contains the row information. Based on all 8,614,058
spells.
Table 9: Imputation Matrix for Procedure IP2A
Imputed data
Original data Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD Total
Missing 28.39 24.98 42.45 0.68 1.25 1.01 1.22 100.00
ND 0.53 82.79 16.17 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.04 100.00
VT 0.30 1.53 96.10 0.06 1.25 0.46 0.29 100.00
HS 4.56 4.37 4.53 73.82 10.11 0.91 1.70 100.00
HSVT 0.92 1.88 5.67 1.79 82.88 3.29 3.56 100.00
TC 0.56 0.69 2.61 0.24 0.54 90.48 4.88 100.00
UD 0.42 0.29 1.09 0.25 0.36 0.49 97.10 100.00
Total 3.10 25.68 62.13 1.03 2.47 2.30 3.28 100.00
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities the column information will be
imputed given the spell originally contains the row information. Based on all 8,614,058
spells.
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Table 10: Imputation Matrix for Procedure IP2B
Imputed data
Original data Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD Total
Missing 20.43 27.79 46.99 0.84 1.51 1.12 1.33 100.00
ND 0.17 83.66 15.68 0.25 0.16 0.05 0.04 100.00
VT 0.10 0.89 97.00 0.06 1.23 0.45 0.27 100.00
HS 2.10 3.87 4.53 77.12 9.94 0.86 1.58 100.00
HSVT 0.42 1.30 4.46 0.88 86.31 3.18 3.43 100.00
TC 0.29 0.46 2.07 0.16 0.44 91.84 4.74 100.00
UD 0.22 0.19 0.83 0.15 0.30 0.37 97.93 100.00
Total 2.09 25.80 62.89 1.06 2.54 2.32 3.30 100.00
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities the column information will be
imputed given the spell originally contains the row information. Based on all 8,614,058
spells.
Table 11: Imputation Matrix for Procedure IP3
Imputed data
Original data Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD Total
Missing 20.94 24.22 48.93 0.87 2.23 1.30 1.51 100.00
ND 2.53 78.97 17.55 0.39 0.41 0.09 0.06 100.00
VT 0.83 0.78 95.57 0.04 1.76 0.65 0.37 100.00
HS 2.37 1.32 6.09 72.97 14.31 1.08 1.86 100.00
HSVT 2.26 0.56 3.31 0.33 84.87 4.13 4.53 100.00
TC 1.14 0.26 1.74 0.13 0.51 90.21 6.01 100.00
UD 0.51 0.06 0.52 0.09 0.24 0.46 98.11 100.00
Total 3.24 24.09 62.77 1.03 2.99 2.45 3.43 100.00
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities the column information will be
imputed given the spell originally contains the row information. Based on all 8,614,058
spells.
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Table 12: Wage Percentiles for Men by Skill Group for 1984 and
1997
Year Skill group Percentile Orig. data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
1984 U 20 80 80 80 80 80
50 97 96 97 97 97
80 116 115 116 116 117
M 20 90 88 88 88 88
50 110 109 109 109 109
80 145 142 143 143 142
H 20 143 139 141 141 140
1997 U 20 113 107 106 108 109
50 142 140 138 140 141
80 173 170 169 171 173
M 20 133 129 132 130 129
50 166 161 164 163 162
80 222 213 217 215 214
H 20 206 197 207 203 198
Notes: The table contains the percentiles of the daily wages in DEM for Men working
fulltime in West Germany without apprentices. The skill group U comprises of ND and
HS, M comprises of VT and HSVT; H comprises of TC and UD. The 50th and the 80th
wage percentile for H cannot be reported because the wage data is right censored.
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Table 13: Wage Inequality for Men Between Skill Groups for 1984
and 1997
Year Groups At percentile Orig. data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
1984 M-U 50 0.126 0.127 0.117 0.117 0.117
M-U 20 0.118 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095
H-M 20 0.463 0.457 0.471 0.471 0.464
1997 M-U 50 0.156 0.140 0.173 0.152 0.139
M-U 20 0.163 0.187 0.219 0.185 0.168
H-M 20 0.438 0.423 0.450 0.446 0.428
change M-U 50 0.030 0.013 0.056 0.035 0.022
M-U 20 0.045 0.092 0.124 0.090 0.073
H-M 20 -0.026 -0.034 -0.022 -0.026 -0.036
Notes: The table contains differences in log wages between skill groups at specific wage
percentiles based on the wage values from table 12 .
Table 14: Wage Inequality for Men Within Skill Groups for 1984
and 1997
Year Skill group Measure Orig. data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
1984 U 50%-20% 0.193 0.182 0.193 0.193 0.193
80%-50% 0.179 0.181 0.179 0.179 0.187
M 50%-20% 0.201 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.214
80%-50% 0.276 0.264 0.271 0.271 0.264
1997 U 50%-20% 0.228 0.269 0.264 0.260 0.257
80%-50% 0.197 0.194 0.203 0.200 0.205
M 50%-20% 0.222 0.222 0.217 0.226 0.228
80%-50% 0.291 0.280 0.280 0.277 0.278
change U 50%-20% 0.036 0.086 0.071 0.067 0.065
80%-50% 0.019 0.014 0.024 0.021 0.017
M 50%-20% 0.021 0.008 0.003 0.012 0.014
80%-50% 0.014 0.015 0.009 0.005 0.014
Notes: The table contains differences in log wages within skill groups between the respec-
tive percentiles based on the wage values from table 12.
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Table 17: Mincer-type Earnings Regression (Tobit) 3
IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
ND -0.122 (0.003) -0.120 (0.003) -0.119 (0.003) -0.117 (0.003)
HS -0.029 (0.020) -0.039 (0.018) -0.034 (0.018) -0.017 (0.019)
HSVT 0.091 (0.005) 0.103 (0.006) 0.101 (0.006) 0.086 (0.005)
TC 0.247 (0.005) 0.253 (0.005) 0.252 (0.005) 0.250 (0.005)
UD 0.327 (0.005) 0.340 (0.005) 0.339 (0.005) 0.328 (0.005)
age/10 0.166 (0.005) 0.165 (0.005) 0.169 (0.005) 0.169 (0.005)
age sq/100 -0.012 (0.001) -0.012 (0.001) -0.012 (0.001) -0.012 (0.001)
reportmiss -0.122 (0.004) -0.106 (0.005) -0.112 (0.004) -0.120 (0.004)
underreport -0.113 (0.003) -0.106 (0.004) -0.104 (0.004) -0.116 (0.003)
overreport -0.331 (0.011) -0.181 (0.012) -0.211 (0.017) 0.008 (0.020)
foreign -0.065 (0.003) -0.065 (0.003) -0.067 (0.003) -0.068 (0.003)
farmer -0.216 (0.009) -0.216 (0.009) -0.217 (0.009) -0.215 (0.009)
service worker -0.046 (0.006) -0.044 (0.006) -0.047 (0.006) -0.046 (0.006)
sales worker 0.165 (0.005) 0.165 (0.005) 0.165 (0.005) 0.165 (0.005)
clerical worker 0.228 (0.003) 0.227 (0.003) 0.227 (0.003) 0.230 (0.003)
admin worker 0.281 (0.003) 0.279 (0.003) 0.280 (0.003) 0.282 (0.003)
agriculture -0.014 (0.005) -0.013 (0.005) -0.014 (0.005) -0.013 (0.005)
basic industry 0.013 (0.003) 0.013 (0.003) 0.013 (0.003) 0.013 (0.003)
consumer goods -0.088 (0.003) -0.087 (0.003) -0.088 (0.003) -0.088 (0.003)
food industry -0.112 (0.005) -0.111 (0.005) -0.111 (0.005) -0.112 (0.005)
main construction -0.037 (0.003) -0.039 (0.003) -0.038 (0.003) -0.039 (0.003)
constr completion -0.124 (0.004) -0.124 (0.004) -0.124 (0.004) -0.123 (0.004)
trade -0.177 (0.003) -0.177 (0.003) -0.177 (0.003) -0.178 (0.003)
transport & comm -0.139 (0.004) -0.138 (0.004) -0.138 (0.004) -0.139 (0.004)
business services -0.116 (0.004) -0.117 (0.004) -0.118 (0.004) -0.119 (0.004)
consumer services -0.356 (0.009) -0.350 (0.009) -0.357 (0.009) -0.359 (0.009)
education -0.197 (0.004) -0.198 (0.004) -0.199 (0.004) -0.198 (0.004)
public admin -0.182 (0.004) -0.182 (0.004) -0.182 (0.004) -0.183 (0.004)
intercept 4.673 (0.009) 4.673 (0.009) 4.664 (0.009) 4.664 (0.009)
lnsigma -1.221 (0.004) -1.225 (0.004) -1.220 (0.004) -1.218 (0.004)
N 153,431 151,769 153,199 152,258
censored 17,302 17,228 17,294 17,162
Notes: Dependent variable log daily wage, which is right censored at the social security
threshold. Men in West Germany working fulltime 1995, no apprentices. The omitted
education is VT, omitted occupation salaried employee and omitted industry investment
goods industry. Spells weighted with their length. Robust standard errors clustered at
the person level are in parenthesis. reportmiss, underreport and overreport are defined in
comparison to the original data.
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Table 18: Probit Regression of Underreport compared to IP2A
Regressors Marg eff Robust SE Regressors Marg eff Robust SE
≤19 years -0.048 (0.000)** 1-2 reports by empl 0.037 (0.001)**
30-39 years 0.015 (0.001)** 3-5 reports by empl 0.020 (0.001)**
40-49 years 0.007 (0.001)** spell≤30 days 0.016 (0.001)**
50-59 years -0.005 (0.001)** 30<spell≤180 days 0.011 (0.000)**
60+ years -0.017 (0.001)** year 75 -0.037 (0.000)**
female -0.007 (0.001)** year 76 -0.034 (0.000)**
married -0.003 (0.000)** year 77 -0.029 (0.000)**
foreign -0.020 (0.001)** year 78 -0.022 (0.000)**
trainee 0.029 (0.001)** year 79 -0.016 (0.000)**
non-skilled worker 0.057 (0.001)** year 80 -0.012 (0.000)**
skilled worker -0.028 (0.001)** year 81 -0.008 (0.000)**
master craftsman/forman -0.024 (0.001)** year 82 -0.006 (0.000)**
home worker 0.042 (0.008)** year 83 -0.005 (0.000)**
part time ≤18h 0.023 (0.003)** year 84 -0.002 (0.000)**
part time >18h 0.012 (0.001)** year 86 0.001 (0.000)*
farmers/farm managers 0.012 (0.002)** year 87 0.002 (0.000)**
service workers -0.002 (0.001)* year 88 0.003 (0.000)**
sales workers -0.007 (0.001)** year 89 0.004 (0.001)**
clerical workers -0.002 (0.001) year 90 0.005 (0.001)**
admin/profes/techn staff -0.000 (0.001) year 91 0.005 (0.001)**
agriculture -0.006 (0.002)** year 92 0.005 (0.001)**
basic industry -0.002 (0.001) year 93 0.005 (0.001)**
consumer goods industry 0.006 (0.001)** year 94 0.004 (0.001)**
food industry -0.002 (0.001) year 95 0.003 (0.001)**
main construction trade 0.026 (0.002)** year 96 0.001 (0.001)
construction completion trade 0.002 (0.002) year 97 -0.001 (0.001)
trade 0.006 (0.001)**
transport and communication -0.003 (0.001)*
business services 0.007 (0.001)**
consumer services 0.003 (0.001)
education, non profit org 0.002 (0.001)
public administration -0.002 (0.001)
observed Prob 0.060
predicted Prob at x¯ 0.047
N 6,352,330
Pseudo R2 0.078
Notes: Dependent variable: dummy for reported education lower than imputed education
(IP2A). Estimation based on all employment spells in West Germany. Base category:
20-29 years, male, not married, German, working fulltime as a salaried employee,
occupation group Operatives/craft, investment goods industry, more than five reports by
the employer about the employee, spell longer than 180 days, 1985. Intercept included in
estimation. Robust standard errors with clustering at the person level. * significant at
5%, ** significant at 1%.
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